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Income inequality has been increasing since the early 1970s, but there has been little 
analysis of whether American voters consider this issue when casting a ballot. This study 
combines survey data from the 2012 American National Election Study with Gini coefficients at 
the Congressional district level to evaluate whether attitudes about income inequality and actual 
income inequality have a significant impact on vote choice for Congressional candidates in the 
2012 election. As control variables are added, predictor questions about income inequality 
remain significant, while Gini coefficients become statistically insignificant. This analysis 
provides evidence that attitudes about income inequality as a political issue have a more 
important influence on vote choice than do actual conditions at the district level.  
Introduction 
Prior to 2012, political candidates have given the issue of income inequality little 
attention during campaigns. During his campaign for the 2012 Presidential election, President 
Barack Obama addressed growing income inequality as a key issue, and the Democratic Party 
has taken income inequality on as an important issue in more recent election cycles (Bender et al. 
2014; Bloomberg; Zuckerman 2014; The Atlantic). Whether income inequality has the potential 
to gain traction as a key issue may be substantiated by the outcome of the 2012 election for 
Congressional candidates, and the effects of inequality within voter’s districts on their likelihood 
of voting Democratic.  
Although income inequality has been steadily increasing in the United States, it appears 
to be a newer form of economic turmoil as it was rarely addressed prior to the 2008 recession 
and the Obama Administration. My research will focus on U.S. House races to determine 
whether President Obama declaring income inequality as a campaign issue had an impact on 
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elections for the House of Representatives. Many Democrats are now making income inequality 
a key issue of their party platform, and whether voters recognize it as a government problem may 
sway their vote choice in Congressional elections in the future. A recent Politico article 
highlighted the emphasis on income inequality during 2012 and future elections, declaring “The 
focus on income inequality builds on the economic themes Obama successfully harnessed to beat 
Mitt Romney in 2012. Democrats believe they can win again by spotlighting the growing divides 
between the rich and poor and daring Republicans to oppose legislation aimed at benefiting low-
income Americans” (Everett 2014; Politico). It is important to consider how income inequality 
became a key issue for Democrats over the past couple of years. It appears that this issue has 
gained attention as a result of politicians, rather than voters. This study seeks to evaluate how 
voters perceive the issue, and whether it is something they will consider when casting a ballot.  
The importance of income inequality as an issue demonstrates the evolution of the subject as a 
political problem that may tell us whether voters recognize income inequality as an issue, 
whether they experience or perceive it within their district, or whether they believe it should be 
addressed by government policies.  
To determine the effect of income inequality on vote choice for Congressional candidates 
during the 2012 election, I will evaluate American National Election Survey data from 2012 by 
Congressional district for all 50 states to measure the relationship between individual attitudes 
about income inequality and how it translates into vote choice for Congressional candidates. I 
have chosen to conduct this study at the congressional level to measure actual income inequality 
on a small scale, as opposed to a national level. I expect that individual candidate will have little 
effect at the congressional level, as the measure of party will be sufficient in determining the 
effects of income inequality on the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. I will also 
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evaluate Gini coefficients by Congressional district to determine whether perceptions of income 
inequality correlate with actual income inequality within a district. The Gini coefficient is a 
statistical measure that represents the income distribution of residents within a specific area, and 
is a common measure of income inequality internationally (Damgaard 2015). 2012 ANES survey 
data will also be used because 2012 is the first year that the ANES has asked respondents about 
income equality specifically.  
How does income inequality at the district level influence individual vote choice for 
Congressional candidates? 
The contents of this paper will first discuss the literature related to this question, and what 
gaps can be filled by my research. I will then discuss the theory motivating my question, and the 
reasoning behind my hypotheses. This will lead to the research design detailing how I plan to test 
my hypotheses, followed by the results. The paper will close with a discussion of potential 
strengths and weaknesses of the design, and a general conclusion of this research.  
Literature Review 
Although income inequality has been steadily increasing since the early 1970s and has 
been a topic of social science research, little analysis has been done to determine its political 
impact until the early 2000s. Survey data discussing it as a specific issue has been scarce. 
Instead, issues surrounding poverty, redistributive policies, and equality of opportunity rather 
than equality of outcomes have been used to determine individual perception of income 
inequality (McCall, 2007; 39). Assessing income inequality in the context of the Obama 
Presidency as a determinant of individual vote choice is relevant as it has gained traction as a 
Democratic campaign issue (Bender et al. 2014; Bloomberg).  
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Partisan Voting and Income Inequality 
The topic of income inequality and its effect on vote choice in 2010 was considered in 
Social Science Quarterly by Gelman et al., who evaluated whether the rise in income inequality 
over the past generation has had an impact on partisan voting (Gelman, et al; 2010). The 
preference for citizens with lower incomes to favor the Democratic Party and citizens with 
higher incomes to favor the Republican Party results in unexpected voting trends. Evidence of 
this can be seen in very poor states that vote Republican in every election (Gelman, et al; 2010). 
As income inequality has continued to increase, little difference was found in class based voting. 
Instead, they discovered that although both parties have moved farther apart on economic issues, 
there is evidence that vote share for Democratic candidates is increasing among high earning 
voters (Gelman, et al; 2010). This study demonstrates little relationship between the rise in 
income inequality and class based voting. My evaluation of income inequality as a polarizing 
issue for individuals differentiates the effects of attitudes versus real levels of inequality at the 
district level, building on work related to social class and partisanship.   
The University of Texas Inequality Project has done state level evaluations that define the 
effects of income inequality regionally in election cycles from 1992-2004. Galbraith and Hale 
found that regions and states with high levels of income inequality experience depressed voter 
turnout and a prevalence of vote share for Democratic Presidential candidates (Galbraith, Hale 
2006; 11-12). Because this study identifies a relationship between high inequality and increased 
vote share for the Democratic Party while controlling for race and income, causal mechanisms 
come into question (Galbraith, Hale 2006; 8). Based on the findings in this study, whether 
individuals translate their perception of income inequality into their vote choice is interesting in 
terms of evaluating U.S. House races by district during the 2012 election. My assessment of 
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voter attitudes about income inequality in districts with high and low levels of income inequality 
is intended to determine if individuals who did turnout considered income inequality when 
casting a ballot in the 2012 election, and whether they are more likely to vote on this issue.  
Income inequality and political polarization are shown to increase at a similar rate, 
revealing the relationship between the two since 1975 (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2003). 
Higher income is correlated with Republican Party identification, which has been noted in other 
literature about income inequality and political preferences. Income is shown to have an effect 
on partisanship in this study, and differences in income often determine which party individuals 
identify with (McCarty, Poole, Rosenthal 2003; 11). If individual economic situation relates to 
vote choice, the consistent party preference based on income is relevant to how voters in districts 
with high levels of income inequality perceive their economic situation. This study suggests that 
the relationship between income level and partisanship provides evidence of pocketbook voting, 
as higher incomes relate to a higher likelihood of voting Republican. In addition to the 
expectation that higher Gini index by district leads to a higher likelihood of voting Democratic, 
there is also evidence to suggest that lower income is related to voting Democratic. Whether 
voters believe that income inequality is an issue that the government should address will point to 
its importance as an issue, as well as whether attitudes differ from condition in regards to 
economic issues.  
The increase in party polarization in correlation with the increase in income inequality 
over that last four decades may show amplified differences in interests between upper and lower 
classes in the United States. To gauge the influence that differences between the “haves” and 
“have nots” have on polarization, Dettrey and Campbell tested the class polarization theory 
which assumes that increasing income inequality is to blame for increasing polarization (Dettrey, 
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Campbell 2013; 2). They identified that the number of self-declared moderates has decreased and 
that self-identified conservatives and liberals have increased over the same time period that 
income inequality has steadily increased (Dettrey, Campbell 2013; 11). Aggregate data over 
several elections was used to show a relationship between growing polarization and class 
differences that is not causal. Similar to this study, I will use partisan issues as controls in my 
evaluation of whether voters consider income inequality when casting a ballot. Rather than 
testing polarization over several elections, I will focus on the 2012 election to gauge the 
importance of income inequality in the context of the Obama Presidency.  
The relationship between Presidential Administrations and their effect on income 
inequality may serve as a basis for Democratic Party preference in areas with higher income 
inequality. Based on data from 1980-2000, Larry Bartels discovered that income inequality has 
grown under Republican Administrations and retracted during Democratic Administrations 
(Bartels 2004; 13-14). Before income inequality became a key component of the Democratic 
Party platform, Bartels demonstrates that there is reason to believe that the Democratic Party 
represents the interests of lower income voters more than the Republican Party. Although 
Galbraith and Hale were unable to pinpoint a causal relationship between higher income 
inequality and higher Democratic Party vote share, the correlation between Democratic 
Presidents influencing lower levels of economic inequality again relates the interests of those 
who are of both lower economic status and those who see increasing income inequality as a key 
issue represented by the Democratic Party.  
Perception of Income Inequality 
When it comes to partisan issues, it is important to consider whether voters care about 
certain issues regardless of if they directly affect them. In the American Journal of Political 
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Science, Gregory Markus discussed the difference between sociotropic and pocketbook voting in 
determining which factors individuals consider when they cast a vote. While most people prefer 
a healthy economy, he claimed that it is difficult to discern whether people vote based on their 
own economic condition (pocketbook voting) or whether the focus is on perception of national 
economic conditions (sociotropic voting). Reasons for voting behavior are critical to whether 
people make judgments about parties or candidates based on their own economic situation, 
especially in light of increasing income inequality after the economic recession of 2008 (Markus, 
1988). By testing attitudes about income inequality and actual income inequality indicated by the 
Gini coefficient within Congressional districts, the effects of both sociotropic and pocketbook 
voting will be considered in this study. Actual conditions will be measured by Gini coefficients 
and income, and attitudes will be considered through ANES 2012 questions in which 
respondents are asked several questions about whether they recognize income inequality and 
whether they think the government should take action to reduce it. In testing significance for 
these factors, I can better understand whether voters are more likely to vote based on their 
economic conditions or their attitude about this income inequality.  
Attitudes about inequality have been evaluated in the context of individuals knowing and 
caring about income inequality on a national level. Leslie Mccall, from the Institute of Policy 
Research at Northwestern University, measured American’s lack of attention to income 
inequality versus their lack of concern. Her discovery that Americans are unable to discern 
increasing income inequality from the overall improvement in standard of living relates to Larry 
Bartels 2003 study about individual perception of the Bush Era tax cuts (Mccall 2005; Bartels 
2008). These two studies attempt to uncover whether individuals do not know about income 
inequality, or whether they are simply not concerned. Both Bartels and Mccall find that when it 
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comes to understanding economic policy, people are often likely to vote against their own 
interests due to limited information or understanding. This is exemplified by Bartels in context of 
the Bush Era Tax cuts. Bartels claims “public support stems from unenlightened considerations 
of self-interest on part of people who do not recognize the implications of Bush’s policies for 
their own economic well-being or their broader political values” (Bartels 2008; 28). Similarly, 
Mccall found both a lag in knowledge and a complication about the issue of income inequality as 
being harder to solve than inequality based on other factors, such as race or gender (Mccall 2005; 
6). This is relevant to testing the effects of both actual conditions and attitudes about income 
inequality to evaluate whether voters differentiate between the conditions of their district in 
relation to income inequality as an issue.  
McCall performed additional data analysis in 2007, to discuss how perceptions about 
income inequality changed from 1987 to 2000. Her assumption that people perceive inequality as 
an issue is demonstrated by survey results from the General Social Survey and International 
Social Survey Program indicating that economic inequality is generally too large, too unfair, and 
unnecessary, with marginal differences during each year (McCall, 2007; 26). Despite the lack of 
media or political attention given to the income inequality, McCall demonstrates that individuals 
are still able to recognize it. The intent of my research is to show that when it is taken on as a 
political issue, voters may be more likely to factor their frustrations with income inequality into 
their vote. McCall points out the ambiguity associated with the issue of income inequality, and 
the lack of information about it as a political issue (McCall, 2007; 4). Now that this issue has 
been politicized, there may be a higher likelihood of voters considering it as important as other 
key partisan issues, such as the environment, welfare spending, defense spending, marriage 
equality, or reproductive rights. In relation to these issues, income inequality is relatively new in 
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the political arena. The influence it gains is important to consider in the context of both 
sociotropic and pocketbook voting as it becomes more relevant to voters’ economic conditions 
and attitudes.  
Existing literature regarding income inequality demonstrates how it relates to policy 
understanding and partisan preferences. Evaluations of income inequality at an individual level 
based on Congressional districts may shed light on how voters view their situation and the 
situation of those around them. Whether this affects the likelihood of voting Democratic is 
relevant to whether voters take income inequality into account at the polls and which factors in 
their own lives lead them to do so. The intent of my research is to fill in gaps by providing up to 
date information from the 2012 Presidential election as income inequality gains traction as a 
political issue, and identify the relationship between income inequality as a partisan issue and 
individual vote choice. My research can provide relevant information in regards to whether 
voters care about income inequality as it has gained national attention.  
Theory 
In measuring whether the Democrats have successfully been able to utilize the issue of 
income inequality, the predictors of this possibility are important to address. The effects of 
income inequality have been real for several decades, but it may have been essential for a 
political party to draw attention to the issue for voters to understand it in a political context. As 
the public has become more aware, I believe that whether it effects individuals or not, there is 
likely some understanding towards the fact that income gaps have been increasing since the early 
1970s. Even from a non-partisan stance, I think most would agree that this is an issue.  
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In the past, income inequality was a vague and ambiguous issue that could often be 
overshadowed by poverty and other forms of inequality (Mccall 2005; 5, 6). There is a lack of 
evidence to suggest that income inequality does not affect vote choice after it specifically 
became a key issue of the Democratic Party, especially because it had not previously been 
directly addressed in surveys. Previous survey data has inquired about poverty, redistributive 
policies, and opportunity (McCall, 2007; 39). Without the ability to collect survey data that 
directly addresses income inequality as an issue, it is difficult to determine whether respondents 
were able to recognize it as an issue aside from poverty or welfare policy in general. Voters 
specifically may have been apathetic about income inequality as an economic issue because it 
was largely ignored in politics prior to the 2012 election. Despite evidence that vote choice and 
polarization has not been influenced by the increase in income inequality, I believe that voters 
were more likely to consider income inequality when deciding whom to vote for in 2012. 
Because President Obama won the 2012 election, I expect that the increase in awareness led 
voters to consider income inequality when casting a ballot at a higher likelihood than it being a 
key issue in previous elections 
Based on the steady increase in income inequality over five decades, it may be safe to 
assume that little has been done on a federal level to address this issue specifically (Bartels, 
2004; 2). The ANES first asked survey respondents how they feel about increasing income 
inequality in 2012, the same year that the Democrats officially took it on as an issue they wish to 
address in opposition to the Republican Party (Bender et al. 2014; Bloomberg; Zuckerman 2014’ 
The Atlantic). While the Democratic Party has historically been viewed as representing labor 
over business interests, the 2012 election led to incumbent Senators and House Representatives 
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winning re-election in 2012 at just over 90%, leading to a Republican majority in the House of 
Representatives and a smaller Democratic majority in the Senate (opensecrets.org).  
In previous studies, results have indicated that individuals do not typically recognize 
income inequality unless they are directly affected by it (Xu, Garand 2010). This may be a 
function of the districts that people live in, and whether there is a visible presence of vast 
economic differences within a community. High levels of income inequality seem to be a 
characteristic of more districts represented by House Democrats than by Republicans (Bender et 
al. 2014; Bloomberg). These areas often have both affluent and urban neighborhoods, which 
shows an interesting interaction between high-income democratic voters and minority voters 
who also tend to vote democratic (Bender et al. 2014; Bloomberg). It is a possibility that 
Democrats in office are choosing to address the issue because they represent a broader range of 
districts when it comes to economic inequality, representing some of the poorest and the richest 
districts in the country, and also the districts with the highest income inequality within them 
(Zuckerman 2014; The Atlantic). These two groups are exposed to the conditions of income 
inequality within their districts, but may also consider the Democratic Party as one that is more 
likely to resolve issues of inequality within their communities.  
Before income inequality had been politically defined, it would have been difficult to 
assess whether individuals realize it exists, let alone allow them to form an opinion about it. Now 
that it has gained importance as a political issue, real conditions are likely to be on the forefront 
of voters’ minds. Since the Democrats have claimed the issue, I expect that indicators of actual 
income inequality, such as income and Gini index at the district level, will have an important 
influence on the likelihood of voting Democratic. In other words, if a voter lives in a District 
with high income inequality as indicated by the Gini coefficient, or if they have a low income, 
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they will have a higher likelihood of voting Democratic. Both income level and self-identified 
class are likely to have an influence on the likelihood of voting Democratic. Actual economic 
conditions may lead voters to identify with one party or another based on their platform or the 
lasting impressions of different economic interests that each party represents, the Democrats 
being labor and lower classes, and the Republicans representing business interests and those with 
higher income levels (Bartels 2004; 13-14). This would suggest that individuals consider their 
own economic conditions when voting, as the effects of real income inequality may influence 
voters to subscribe to the message that Democratic candidates are beginning to send on behalf of 
this issue.  
It is also my expectation that voters who perceive the increase in income inequality, 
whether it is in their district, or just nationally (the ANES question just asks nationally) will also 
be more likely to vote Democratic. Whether voters recognize income inequality or not may not 
be as significant as whether they believe the government should take measures to reduce income 
differences, but those who either do not think income inequality has increased or who think it has 
decreased over the past 20 years (as specified by the ANES question), would have a much lower 
likelihood of voting Democratic. I expect this because as cited above, the Democratic Party has 
an association with labor interests, as well as higher spending on social programs (Bartels 2004; 
13-14). If an ANES respondent does not recognize the increase in income inequality in the 
United States, I do not expect that their likelihood of voting Democratic would be high in a 
significant way. 
Whether the respondent lives in a district with high income inequality or not, or whether 
they are a high income earner or not, I expect that if they agree that the government should take 
measure to reduce income inequality, they have a higher likelihood of voting Democratic. This 
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would provide evidence for sociotropic voting on behalf of this issue, as is similar of other 
partisan issues such as abortion, marriage equality, the cause of climate change, and many others. 
Although the voter is often not directly affected by most traditional partisan opinions about these 
issues, they are likely to use them as a major predictor of vote choice. My predictions about the 
likelihood of income inequality gaining traction as a Democratic issue, and being an influence on 
the likelihood of voting Democratic in both tangible and abstract ways stem from the assumption 
that voters are likely to respond to their conditions and act on their values. As evidenced by other 
key issues, attitudes have a stronger effect than actual relation to the issue, which I believe will 
also be true of perception of income inequality. Whether voters believe that the government 
should take action to reduce income inequality is likely to be the most important predictor of 
Democratic vote choice of the measures that I have tested, with real conditions remaining 
significant, only less so. 
I expect to identify partisan trends based on increased awareness of income inequality in 
terms of individual vote choice for the 2012 election (Gelman, et al; 2010). We may see different 
effects on individual vote choice based on the level of income inequality within each individual 
district, as those who live in districts with higher income inequality may be more likely to vote 
based on the prevalence of the issue in their community. For individuals who believe that income 
inequality is a pressing issue in the United States, their votes for congressional candidates may 
reflect that concern. Individuals who struggle with low income themselves may be more likely to 
support candidates who make it a priority issue on their campaign. By using both survey data and 
Gini coefficients, we can understand whether the likelihood of individuals voting for Democratic 
candidates relates to their attitudes about income inequality and the level of income inequality 
within their district.  
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Hypotheses 
H1: Individuals who believe that income inequality has increased within the past 20 years will be 
more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate than those who do not think this.  
H2: Individuals who believe that the government should take measures to decrease income 
inequality will be more likely to vote for Democratic candidates than those who do not think this. 
H3: If a district has high actual income inequality, voters will be more likely to vote for 
Democratic candidates than if there are not high levels of income inequality.  
H4: The higher an individual’s income level, the less likely they are to vote for a Democratic 
candidate.  
H5: If an individual identifies as below middle class, they will be more likely to vote for a 
Democratic candidate than if they identify as above middle class. 
Methods 
The American National Election Study specifically asked respondents how they felt 
about income inequality for the first time in 2012. The relationship between Gini coefficients, 
class, and income as an indicator of actual income inequality and ANES survey responses about 
income inequality will serve as the independent variables in predicting individual vote choice, 
which is the dependent variable. Both Gini coefficients and ANES survey responses are available 
by Congressional district.  
For the dependent variable, vote choice for congressional candidate, vote for a 
Republican candidate is indicated by the value of zero, and vote for a Democratic candidate is 
indicated by a value of one. 
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The ANES 2012 questions about income inequality and their variable names are as follows: 
1. Inequality_gap: Do you think the difference in incomes between rich people and poor 
people in the United States today is LARGER, SMALLER, or ABOUT THE SAME as it 
was 20 years ago? 
 
2. Gov_inequality is a combination of these two survey questions, recoded on a 2 point 
scale where the most disagreement has a value of zero, and the highest agreement has a 
value of 2:  
 
Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'The 
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. 
 
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government trying to make 
this income difference smaller? 
 
3. Inequality_goodbad: Is it good, bad, or neither good nor bad that the DIFFERENCE 
between the top and the bottom incomes has changed this way? 
 
For each of the survey questions about income inequality above, the lowest response value 
corresponds with the least concern about income inequality, and the highest response value 
corresponds with the most concern about income inequality. Gini coefficient values range from 
zero to one, with a value of one indicating all income within the measured society is earned by 
one individual, and the value of zero indicating complete income equality within a society. The 
Gini coefficient is summary statistic of the Lorenz curve that is calculated as “the mean of the 
difference between every possible pair of individuals, divided by the mean size” (Damgaard 
2015). “The Lorenz curve is used in economics and ecology to describe inequality in wealth or 
size. It is a function of the cumulative proportion of ordered individuals mapped onto the 
corresponding cumulative proportion of their size” (Damgaard 2015). The Gini coefficient is a 
widely used measure of income distribution on many scales, from an international to a district 
level. The district Gini coefficients are from 2012, and were collected from an article called “The 
Polarized Partisan Geography of Inequality” in The Atlantic (Zuckerman 2014).  
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Some of the variables that I will control for include race, gender, party identification, and 
ideology. I have coded race to a scale of two possible answers, the value of one being white and 
the value of two being non-white. Race is correlated with partisanship as white voters have had a 
tendency to vote Republican, indicating the possibility that this variable could serve as a function 
of vote choice (Associated Press 2012). There is also evidence that gender has an influence on 
vote choice, where female voters have a higher likelihood of voting Democratic and male voters 
have a higher likelihood of voting Republican (Associated Press 2012). It is also important to test 
the influence of party identification and ideology to determine whether attitudes about income 
inequality or actual income inequality hold up against the two major predictors of vote choice.  
Other partisan issues will be added as controls to determine the relationship between the 
likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate and attitudes about income inequality when 
other key partisan issues are considered. I will include survey questions about the cause of 
climate change, whether the government should take measures to protect the environment, 
whether the government should spend more money on welfare and defense, and respondent 
attitudes about gay marriage and abortion. I have chosen to show the effects of these issues 
against the significance of attitudes about income inequality and indicators of actual income 
inequality to determine whether income inequality remains significant despite its recent 
emergence as an issue on Democratic campaigns. Existing studies provide little evidence to 
suggest that voters care about income inequality at all, and testing their effects against other issue 
controls will display how the issue has evolved for voters.  
I will first display the relationship between likelihood of Democratic vote choice and 
income inequality through multivariate regression analysis by including the predictor questions 
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listed above, the Gini coefficients by district, and demographic controls such as income, gender, 
and race.  
In the second regression model, I will add party identification and ideology as controls. 
Both variables have seven possible responses, where the most conservative or Republican 
correspond with the lowest values, and the most liberal or Democratic correspond with highest 
values. It is important to demonstrate the impact that these two variables have on the significance 
of income inequality in influencing vote choice as they are the most obvious predictors of vote 
choice.  
The third model will include the attitudes about key partisan issues mentioned above as 
control variables. For the purposes of this research, including major partisan issues is important 
to compare with income inequality as a potential key partisan issue in the future.  
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Results 
 Table 1: Explaining Democratic House Vote 
  
Coefficients 
and standard 
errors 
 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Belief that inequality is increasing 0.000*  0.103 
 (0.017)   
Belief that government should act to reduce 
inequality 0.000* 
 
0.390 
 (0.014)   
Belief that inequality is a bad thing 0.002*  0.057 
 (0.014)   
Gini index 0.000*  0.077 
 (0.267)   
Income 0.854  0.003 
 (0.001)  . 
Self-identified class 0.264          0.019 
 (0.020)   
Race  0.000*  0.246 
 (0.019)   
Gender 0.153  0.024 
 (0.016)   
Constant       0.000   
 (0.135)   
    
N 2596   
R2 0.315   
 2012 ANES.  Regression estimates.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 1 displays the relationship between the dependent variable (vote choice), the ANES 
income inequality questions, Gini coefficients at the district level, income, class, and two 
demographic controls (race and gender). The significance of the income inequality predictor 
questions and Gini index is highest in this model. The direction of the relationship is positive, as 
higher levels of agreement about government action on income inequality and a higher Gini 
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coefficient within a district correlates with a higher likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
candidate. In this model, self-identified class and income are insignificant variables.  
Moving from the lowest level of inequality_gap to the highest level, I would expect a 
0.201 total increase in the likelihood of voting Democratic. This indicates that those who believe 
the gap in income inequality is larger than in the past are expected to vote 0.201 higher on a scale 
where Republican candidate is equal to 0 and Democratic candidate it equal to 1. This provides 
evidence for Hypothesis 1, that individuals who believe the gap between income levels has 
increased over the past 20 years has a significant likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
candidate.  
A respondent with the highest level of support for government action on income 
inequality is 0.288 points more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate in their congressional 
race than a respondent who feels most strongly against government action on income inequality. 
The significance of this variable supports Hypothesis 2, that “individuals who think the 
government should take action to reduce income inequality will be more likely to vote for a 
Democratic candidate than those who do not think this.” Moving from the lowest level of 
inequality_goodbad to the highest level, we would expect a 0.088 unit increase in the likelihood 
voting for a Democratic candidate.  
For each unit increase in Gini index, I would expect a 1.23 increase of voting for a 
Democratic candidate. The significance of this variable supports Hypothesis 3, that higher levels 
of income inequality within a district will increase the likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
candidate.  
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Moving from the lowest level of the race variable to the highest level, I expect a 0.261 
increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate (1. White 2. Non-white). The 
influence of self-identified class and income on the likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
candidate are statistically insignificant in this model. Income and class as insignificant variables 
relates to the evidence presented by Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su in their result that level of 
income did not have predicted effects on voting (Gelman, et al; 2010). This suggests that 
respondents to this survey are more likely to vote based on attitudes or conditions that may not 
be directly related to them than on their own income level or socioeconomic class.  
The standardized coefficient indicates that gov_inequality is the most important predictor 
of Democratic vote choice in this model (0.390), with race being second (0.246), and 
inequality_gap being third (0.103). Attitudes about income inequality are important predictors of 
vote choice before party identification and ideology are added as controls. Attitudes about 
government action on income inequality are the most significant influence on the likelihood of 
voting for a Democratic candidate, followed by the perception that inequality has increased. This 
suggests accuracy in Hypotheses 1 and 2, and while Gini index is a significant indicator, the race 
variable has a higher likelihood of influencing vote choice. Despite the importance of party 
identification and vote choice, the gov_inequality variable remains significant in the following 
models as control variables are added. 
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 Table 2: Explaining Democratic House Vote 
  
Coefficients 
and standard 
errors 
 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Belief that inequality is increasing 0.004*  0.039 
 (0.013)   
Belief that government should act to reduce 
inequality 0.000* 
 
0.096 
 (0.012)   
Belief that inequality is a bad thing 0.597  0.008 
 (0.011)   
Gini index 0.012*  0.033 
 (0.213)   
Income 0.290  0.015 
 (0.001)  . 
Self-identified class 0.170          0.019 
 (0.016)   
Race  0.000*  0.083 
 (0.016)   
Gender 0.409         -0.011 
 (0.013)   
Party Identification (7 point scale) 0.000*  0.551 
 (0.004)   
Ideology (7 point scale) 0.000*  0.156 
 (0.006)   
Constant       0.000   
 (0.108)   
    
N 2471   
R2 0.593   
 2012 ANES.  Regression estimates.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 includes the variables in the Table 1, adding party identification and ideology as 
controls to test the significance of inequality variables against the most predictable influences on 
vote choice. Party identification and ideology are typically the most explanatory predictors of 
vote choice in any election. Testing the effects of these variables against actual income 
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inequality and attitudes about income inequality provides a clearer picture of just how much 
inequality matters when controlling for partisan explanations.   
For each unit increase in inequality_gap, I would expect a 0.076 total increase in the 
likelihood of voting Democratic when moving from the belief that the gap in income inequality 
has decreased to the belief that the gap in income inequality has increased. It is important to note 
that inequality_goodbad is no longer significant once party identification and ideology are added 
to the model. It is possible that despite party identification as Republican or a conservative 
ideology has little to do with whether the respondent believes inequality is good or bad. This tells 
us that although there is a higher likelihood of Democrats believing inequality is bad, controlling 
for party identification and ideology decreases the effects of this worry.  
In this model, I would expect a 0.071 increase in the likelihood of voting for a 
Democratic candidate when moving from the highest level to the lowest level of gov_inequality. 
For each unit increase in Giniindex, we would expect a 0.534 increase of voting for a Democratic 
candidate. Moving from the lowest level of the race variable to the highest level, I would expect 
a 0.089 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate.  From the lowest level of 
party identification (Strong Republican) to the highest level (Strong Democrat) on a 7 point 
scale, I would expect a 0.726 increase in the likelihood of voting Democratic. Increasing from 
the lowest level of ideology (Strong conservative) to the highest level (Strong Democrat) I would 
expect a 0.306 increase in the likelihood of voting Democratic.  
The standardized coefficient indicates that partyid is the most important predictor of 
Democratic vote choice in this model (0.551), with idscale being second (0.156), and 
gov_inequality being third (0.096). The effects of party identification are large compared to the 
other significant variables in this model, and ideology is also quite a bit more important than 
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attitudes about income inequality. Despite this, other expected predictors of Democratic vote 
choice in this model such as race or Gini index are not quite as important as the effects of 
attitudes about income inequality on the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. Race 
becomes less important, as does Gini index, although they remain statistically significant. It is 
obvious that party identification and ideology are the strongest predictors of vote choice, but it is 
important to consider that gov_inequality has the strongest influence on the likelihood of voting 
Democratic in this model aside from these two variables.  
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 Table 3: Explaining Democratic House Vote 
  
Coefficients and 
standard errors 
 Standardized 
coefficient 
Belief that inequality is increasing 0.084  0.023 
 (0.013)   
Belief that government should act to reduce 
inequality 0.003* 
 
0.051 
 (0.012)   
Belief that inequality is a bad thing 0.894  0.002 
 (0.011)   
Gini index 0.092  0.022 
 (0.210)   
Income 0.802  0.004 
 (0.001)   
Self-identified class 0.436          0.010 
 (0.015)   
Race  0.000*  0.093 
 (0.016)   
Gender 0.294         -0.013 
 (0.013)   
Party Identification (7 point scale) 0.000*  0.493 
 (0.004)   
Ideology (7 point scale) 0.001*  0.067 
 (0.007)   
Cause of Climate Change 0.032*  0.032 
 (0.010)   
Government action on environment 0.000*  0.072 
 (0.012)   
Government spending on welfare 0.000*  0.084 
 (0.011)   
Government spending on defense 0.000*  -0.053 
 (0.007)   
Whether marriage equality should be legal 0.002*  0.050 
 (0.010)   
Whether abortion should be legal 0.000*  0.067 
 (0.007)   
Constant          0.000   
 (0.110)   
N 2447   
R2 0.615   
 2012 ANES.  Regression estimates.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3 includes attitudes about other partisan issues such as climate change, welfare 
spending, defense spending, marriage equality, and abortion to compare the effects of key 
partisan issues with income inequality as a partisan issue on Democratic vote choice.  
In Table 3, moving from the lowest level of support for government action on income 
inequality to the highest level of support on government action on income inequality, I would 
expect a 0.038 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. Adding partisan 
issues to the regression model has caused inequality_gap to become an insignificant variable, and 
has caused gov_inequality to become slightly less significant in influencing likelihood of voting 
Democratic than in the two previous models. Moving from the lowest level of the race variable 
to the highest level, I would expect a 0.100 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
candidate. Race has been a significant variable in all three models, but has become more 
significant as more control variables are added. Increasing from the lowest level of party 
identification (Strong Republican) to the highest level (Strong Democrat) on a 7 point scale, I 
would expect a 0.648 increase in the likelihood of voting Democratic. Increasing from the lowest 
level of ideology (Strong conservative) to the highest level (Strong Democrat) I would expect a 
0.132 increase in the likelihood of voting Democratic.  
All of the partisan issues included in this model have significant effects on the likelihood 
of voting for a Democratic candidate. Moving from the belief that climate change is caused by 
natural process to the belief that climate change is caused humans only indicated by 
climate_cause, I would expect a 0.044 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
candidate. Moving from the belief that the government should do nothing to reduce climate 
change to the belief that the government should take action to reduce climate change indicated 
by gov_envir, I would expect a 0.096 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
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candidate. Moving from the belief that the government should spend less on welfare to the belief 
that government should spend more on welfare indicated by fedspend_welfare, I would expect a 
0.124 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. Moving from the belief 
that government should spend less on defense to the belief that government should spend more 
on defense indicated by fedspend_defense, I would expect a 0.096 decrease in the likelihood of 
voting for a Democratic candidate. Moving from the belief that gay marriage should have no 
legal recognition to the belief that gay marriage should have complete legal recognition indicated 
by gay_marriage, I would expect a 0.064 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic 
candidate. Moving from the belief that abortion should never be legally permitted to the belief 
that abortion should always be legally permitted indicated by abortion_stance, I would expect a 
0.093 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate.  
Adding respondent attitudes about other partisan issues into the regression table had 
important effects on the relationship between income inequality and the likelihood of voting for a 
Democratic candidate. The most important effect is causing the Gini index, which indicates 
actual income inequality within a congressional district, to become insignificant. Similar to the 
insignificance of income as an influence on vote choice, this finding demonstrates the higher 
likelihood of sociotropic voting. When more partisan issues are added, actual conditions of 
income inequality become much less important than political attitudes while the opinion about 
income inequality remains significant.  
The standardized coefficient indicates that party identification is the most important 
predictor of Democratic vote choice by a large amount in this model (0.492), with race being 
second (0.093), and fedspend_welfare being third (0.084). In the list of 10 significant predictors, 
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gov_inequality is 8th (0.051), with marriage equality and the cause of climate change ranking 
lower in importance.  
Table 3 demonstrates the importance of polarizing issues in determining individual vote 
choice and likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. Although attitudes about income 
inequality are less important than other partisan issues, the model still displays statistical 
significance of the gov_inequality variable despite the very recent polarization of this issue by 
the Democratic Party. When all control variables are added, only Hypothesis 2, “Individuals who 
believe that the government should take measures to decrease income inequality will be more 
likely to vote for Democratic candidates than those who do not think this” is supported by this 
analysis. The effects of traditional partisan issues mitigate the effects of actual income inequality 
indicated by the Gini index. This provides significant evidence of sociotropic voting on behalf of 
this issue, and other partisan issues.  
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Graph 1
 
Another way of looking at measures of actual income inequality and their influence on 
the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate is by comparing the effect of the maximum 
and minimum value for the independent variables. Above is a graphic depiction of the likelihood 
of voting Democratic at the both the lowest and highest levels of income inequality at the district 
level, indicated by the Gini coefficient. With the lowest Gini coefficient out of all districts in the 
United States (0.385), indicating the least inequality, voters are 50% likely to vote for a 
Democratic candidate. This indicates low inequality having no effect on the likelihood of voting 
for a Democratic candidate. At the highest level of income inequality indicated by the Gini 
coefficient (0.584), voters are 57% likely to vote for a Democratic candidate. Despite the effects 
of Gini index being mitigated by issue controls in Table 3, higher actual income inequality is 
correlated with a higher likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate.  
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For gov_inequality, those who disagree most with government action to reduce income 
inequality are just 49% likely to vote for a Democratic candidate, showing little effect of 
disagreement on whether a voter will vote for a Democratic candidate or not. Those who agree 
most with government action to reduce income inequality are 57% likely to vote for a 
Democratic candidate. These two variables held at their maximum and their minimum with all 
other control variables held at their means show the effects of both actual income inequality and 
attitudes about income inequality on the likelihood of voting Democratic. Low inequality and 
disagreement on government action to reduce income inequality have little effect on the 
likelihood of voting Democratic, but higher Gini coefficient and agreements with government 
action to reduce income inequality increase the likelihood of voting Democratic by 7%.  This is 
important because it shows that actual inequality and attitudes about inequality influence the 
likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate in similar ways when all other variables are held 
at their means. Below is an additional graph included to explain the effects of income, and when 
it may have an important effect on vote choice. 
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Graph 2 
 
 Considering that class and income were insignificant variables in the three models above, 
I find it important to consider the conditions under which income does matter. The graph above 
shows the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate when gini index and income are held 
at their margins in a continuous by continuous interaction. When these two variables are 
regressed as a function of vote choice, income displays (0.004) significance and gini index 
displays (0.000) significance. Graph 2 shows the likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate 
when just income and gini index are considered, where lowest income indicates less than $5,000 
per year, and highest income indicates $250,000 + per year. The lowest value for gini index at 
the district level is 0.385, indicating higher equality, and the highest value of gini index is 0.584, 
indicating lower equality or higher inequality. Starting at the left bar, voters who have the lowest 
income and live in a district with high income inequality have only a 32% likelihood of voting 
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for a Democratic candidate. This is contrary to my expectations that both low income and high 
inequality would lead to a higher likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. Even more 
interesting is that the effect of low income in districts with less inequality has a 100% chance of 
voting for a Democratic candidate. The article cited above by Bender, et al. revealed higher 
levels of income inequality in districts that have Democratic representatives (Bender et al. 2014; 
Bloomberg). The results of this graph would suggest that those in more equal districts who have 
a low income would be more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate.  
 Moving over to the third bar, those with the highest income in the most unequal districts 
have a 39% likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. Those with the highest income 
living in the most equal district have a 59% likelihood of voting for a Democratic candidate. The 
effects of this test show when income is a significant predictor of the likelihood of voting for a 
Democratic candidate. In this case, both low and high income voters are more likely to vote for a 
Democratic candidate in districts where there is less income inequality, and less likely to vote for 
a Democratic candidate in districts where there is more income inequality. It is important to 
address the conditions under which actual income inequality does matter, despite the fact that it 
is contrary to my expectations.  
Discussion 
The three models display different relationships between actual income inequality and 
vote choice, and attitudes about income inequality and vote choice. The hypothesis that 
“individuals who believe that the government should take measures to decrease income 
inequality will be more likely to vote for Democratic candidates than those who do not think 
this” holds up in all three models, although the importance of actual income inequality as a 
predictor of Democratic vote choice decreases as more controls are added to the models. Each of 
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my other hypotheses are disproven by Table 3, indicating that attitudes about income inequality 
are the only variables that remain significant when other partisan issues, party identification, and 
ideology are controlled. 
What I find most interesting is the decrease in significance of Gini index as more controls 
are added to the model. My third hypothesis, that “if a district has high actual income inequality, 
voters will be more likely to vote for Democratic candidates than if there are not high levels of 
income inequality,” is disproven by Table 3. Gini index is only a significant variable in the 
absence of other partisan issues. As I mentioned above, I see this as an indication of sociotropic 
voting. Just as income is an insignificant variable in predicting the likelihood of voting 
Democratic, actual income inequality within a district is not as important as respondent attitude 
about income inequality or their attitude about other partisan issues that may or may not directly 
affect them. Adding to this is the fact that when testing income and Gini index with all of the 
controls at their means in Graph 2, the likelihood of voting Democratic is highest in districts that 
are more equal rather than less equal in regards to income. None of the models indicate income 
as significant, and Graph 2 shows how actual indicators of income inequality (income and Gini 
coefficient) have effects that are the opposite of what I predicted. This leads me to believe that 
when attitudes about different issues come into play, voters are less likely to consider their own 
economic situation in relation to the issue. Their attitude about the issue is the most important 
factor, similar to other political issues.  
While this research provides evidence that voters recognize and care about income 
inequality as an issue that is important enough to influence vote choice, the issue decreases in 
importance when compared to attitudes about other partisan issues. Despite this, it is meaningful 
that although income inequality is a very recent issue within the political arena, it remains 
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significant in Table 3 when compared to issues that have had partisan divides for a much longer 
time. Based on the significance of income inequality displayed by the statistics in this study and 
the attention that the Democratic Party has continued to give it as a political issue, there is 
evidence to suggest that the issue will increase in importance in the future as political parties 
continue to include it in their campaigns.  
Different solutions to alleviating income inequality exist across the ideological spectrum, 
but the increase in awareness shows the desire for a government response by many Americans, 
and how they consider it to be an issue that is more significant than in the past. It is important to 
consider the effects of income inequality on vote choice during a time when this issue could 
largely be alleviated by national economic policy (Bartels, 2004; 4). If the Democratic Party had 
success in defining it as a political issue in the 2012 election, there is a possibility of it gaining 
more traction in politics in the future. Since income inequality has become a persistent problem, 
these findings may encourage candidates to address the issue regardless of party, assuming that 
Congressional constituencies are sensitive to it. 
The 2014 midterm election included increased discussion of reducing the effects of 
income inequality from the Democratic Party. Despite this, the Republican Party gained more 
seats in the House of Representatives and more seats in the Senate as well. Many effects may 
have played into the outcome of the midterm elections aside from the effects of income 
inequality on voters, but I believe that this issue will increase in importance and relevance as 
income inequality remains an economic problem in the United States. It is also my expectation 
that the Democrats will continue to campaign on this issue, and that the Republican Party will 
also take measures to at least show their interest in reducing levels of income inequality as a 
higher percentage of the American population have income on the lower half of the scale, 
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indicated by the 2012 ANES. Although the measure for actual income inequality became 
insignificant as partisan attitudes about other issues were added, I think that as awareness of 
income inequality increases, actual conditions may have a higher likelihood of influencing vote 
choice in the future, and increased political attention will encourage distinct attitudes about it on 
both sides of the political spectrum. 
Strengths of this research include a relevant treatment of an issue that is new in the 
political arena. As it continues to gain attention, I expect that more studies will compare the 
effects of politicization of income inequality. By comparing the effects of income inequality as a 
political issue to other partisan issues as well as indicators of actual income inequality, we are 
able to see how it has gained traction as a Democratic issue, as well as how it reflects the 
importance of attitudes about political issues in relation to conditions. Given the opportunity to 
conduct this study over again, I may have included more recent data from the 2014 midterm 
election. Although it was unavailable at the time, Democratic candidates spoke of income 
inequality more during the 2014 midterm election season, and without a Presidential candidate it 
would have been interesting to study whether the issue has gained more attention. I also would 
have liked to conduct the study over several elections rather than just 2012. In coming elections, 
it is likely that the effects of income inequality will be tested in comparison to earlier years of the 
introduction of the issue.  
Despite the disproval of four of my hypotheses, some interesting information can be 
taken from this study. This work provides evidence to suggest that income inequality has been 
able to gain traction as an important political issue despite its recent arrival in the political scene. 
The most important thing I have learned is the strength of attitudes in comparison to conditions. 
As more attitudes were added to the regression tables, conditional variables became less 
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important. Gini index being the only significant variable indicating conditions in the first two 
tables even displays evidence of sociotropic voting as income inequality within a district may not 
directly affect the voter in the same way that income and self-identified class do. Although 
income inequality is a growing issue in the United States, the politicization of the issue is likely 
the most important determinant of whether voters will care about it.  
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Appendix         Stata Outputs 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
Variables 
Income Inequality Questions 
 
abortion_s~e        5855    2.953373    1.090402          1          4
gay_marriage        5834    2.144326    .8018576          1          3
fedspend_d~e        5447    2.957591    1.082631          1          5
fedspend_w~e        5848    1.723837    .7164176          1          3
   gov_envir        5882    2.276267    .7236932          1          3
                                                                      
climate_ca~e        5849     2.14635    .7146508          1          3
     idscale        5300    4.172264    1.470328          1          7
     partyid        5890    4.475722    2.110186          1          7
      gender        5914    1.518938    .4996835          1          2
        race        5885    1.406117    .4911487          1          2
                                                                      
      income        5394    13.63552    8.156628          1         28
   giniindex        5760    .4559865    .0312212       .385       .584
inequality~d        5488    2.423834    .6690538          1          3
gov_inequa~y        5440    .9335478    .6466679          0          2
inequality~p        5816    2.735385    .5535406          1          3
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
                      Total        5,502      100.00
                                                                
                   3. Favor        1,998       36.31      100.00
2. neither favor nor oppose        1,621       29.46       63.69
                  1. Oppose        1,883       34.22       34.22
                                                                
           income ineqality        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
 favor-oppose govt reducing  
     POST: CASI/WEB: Does R  
                        Total        5,443      100.00
                                                                  
            5. agree strongly          519        9.54      100.00
            4. agree somewhat        1,128       20.72       90.46
3. neither agree nor disagree        1,433       26.33       69.74
         2. disagree somewhat          884       16.24       43.41
         1. disagree strongly        1,479       27.17       27.17
                                                                  
            income inequality        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
      POST: CSES: Govt action  
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Based on the similarity of these two survey questions, they have been combined and recoded on 
a scale of 0-2, with 0 indicating the lowest level of support for government action on income 
inequality and 2 indicating the highest level of support for government action on income 
inequality. 
The giniindex variable has not been included as the number of observations is 435. The 
minimum value is 0.385 and the maximum value is 0.584 on a scale from 0 to 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
      Total        5,440      100.00
                                                
          2          322        5.92      100.00
       1.75          712       13.09       94.08
        1.5          625       11.49       80.99
       1.25          515        9.47       69.50
          1          913       16.78       60.04
        .75          500        9.19       43.25
         .5          496        9.12       34.06
        .25          285        5.24       24.94
          0        1,072       19.71       19.71
                                                
        ity        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
gov_inequal  
            Total        5,816      100.00
                                                      
        3. Larger        4,602       79.13      100.00
2. About the same          889       15.29       20.87
       1. Smaller          325        5.59        5.59
                                                      
        years ago        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
     less than 20  
    today more or  
  PRE: Income gap  
                  Total        5,488      100.00
                                                            
                 3. bad        2,884       52.55      100.00
2. neither good nor bad        2,046       37.28       47.45
                1. good          558       10.17       10.17
                                                            
inequality in U.S. good        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
       increased income  
     POST: CASI/WEB: Is  
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Income and Class 
 
 
Demographic Controls 
 
                         Total        5,638      100.00
                                                                   
                5. Upper class            6        0.11      100.00
       4. Upper [middle] class        1,117       19.81       99.89
     3. Average [middle] class        4,404       78.11       80.08
2. Lower[middle/working] class           84        1.49        1.97
       1. Lower class or poor            27        0.48        0.48
                                                                   
    upper working/middle class        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
 PRE: Social class: average or  
                                  Total        5,394      100.00
                                                                            
                   28. $250,000 or more           92        1.71      100.00
                  27. $175,000-$249,999          152        2.82       98.29
                  26. $150,000-$174,999          148        2.74       95.48
                  25. $125,000-$149,999          195        3.62       92.73
                  24. $110,000-$124,999          171        3.17       89.12
                  23. $100,000-$109,999          213        3.95       85.95
                    22. $90,000-$99,999          188        3.49       82.00
                    21. $80,000-$89,999          253        4.69       78.51
                    20. $75,000-$79,999          183        3.39       73.82
                    19. $70,000-$74,999          164        3.04       70.43
                    18. $65,000-$69,999          155        2.87       67.39
                    17. $60,000-$64,999          218        4.04       64.52
                    16. $55,000-$59,999          132        2.45       60.47
                    15. $50,000-$54,999          263        4.88       58.03
                    14. $45,000-$49,999          169        3.13       53.15
                    13. $40,000-$44,999          246        4.56       50.02
                    12. $35,000-$39,999          271        5.02       45.46
                    11. $30,000-$34,999          305        5.65       40.43
                    10. $27,500-$29,999           88        1.63       34.78
                    09. $25,000-$27,499          204        3.78       33.15
                    08. $22,500-$24,999          111        2.06       29.37
                    07. $20,000-$22,499          196        3.63       27.31
                    06. $17,500-$19,999           91        1.69       23.67
                    05. $15,000-$17,499          166        3.08       21.99
                    04. $12,500-$14,999           94        1.74       18.91
                    03. $10,000-$12,499          182        3.37       17.17
                      02. $5,000-$9,999          177        3.28       13.79
                       01. Under $5,000          567       10.51       10.51
                                                                            
    income (see also: incgroup_prepost)        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
      PRE: CASI/WEB: SUMARY- Pre family  
      Total        5,914      100.00
                                                
  2. Female        3,069       51.89      100.00
    1. Male        2,845       48.11       48.11
                                                
      modes        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
FTF and Web  
   for both  
 Respondent  
  Gender of  
   SUMMARY:  
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Partisan Controls
Issue Controls
       Total        5,885      100.00
                                                 
2. Non-white        2,390       40.61      100.00
    1. White        3,495       59.39       59.39
                                                 
       group        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
   ethnicity  
    race and  
  SUMMARY- R  
        PRE:  
                        Total        5,890      100.00
                                                                  
           7. Strong Democrat        1,485       25.21      100.00
  6. Not very Strong Democrat          871       14.79       74.79
      5. Independent-Democrat          747       12.68       60.00
               4. Independent          792       13.45       47.32
    3. Independent-Republican          610       10.36       33.87
2. Not very strong Republican          623       10.58       23.51
         1. Strong Republican          762       12.94       12.94
                                                                  
       PRE: SUMMARY- Party ID        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
                              Total        5,300      100.00
                                                                        
          7. Extremely conservative          208        3.92      100.00
                    6. Conservative        1,001       18.89       96.08
           5. Slightly conservative          789       14.89       77.19
    4. Moderate; middle of the road        1,828       34.49       62.30
                3. Slightly liberal          641       12.09       27.81
                         2. Liberal          638       12.04       15.72
               1. Extremely liberal          195        3.68        3.68
                                                                        
                     self-placement        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
PRE: 7pt scale Liberal/conservative  
                                  Total        5,849      100.00
                                                                            
            3. Mostly by human activity        1,984       33.92      100.00
2. About equally by human activity and         2,737       46.79       66.08
            1. Mostly by natural causes        1,128       19.29       19.29
                                                                            
      PRE: Anthropogenic climate change        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
                Total        5,882      100.00
                                                          
         3. Increased        2,577       43.81      100.00
2.Kept about the same        2,353       40.00       56.19
         1. Decreased          952       16.18       16.18
                                                          
      the environment        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
 Spending: protecting  
  PRE: Federal Budget  
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                 Total        5,848      100.00
                                                           
          3. Increased          916       15.66      100.00
2. Kept about the same        2,401       41.06       84.34
          1. Decreased        2,531       43.28       43.28
                                                           
              programs        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
     Spending: welfare  
   PRE: Federal Budget  
                    Total        5,447      100.00
                                                              
    5. Much more than now          489        8.98      100.00
4. Somewhat more than now        1,070       19.64       91.02
       3. The same as now        2,153       39.53       71.38
2. Somewhat less than now        1,191       21.87       31.85
    1. Much less than now          544        9.99        9.99
                                                              
     expenditure: defense        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
       POST: CSES: Public  
                                  Total        5,834      100.00
                                                                            
3. Gay and lesbian couples should be al        2,357       40.40      100.00
2. Gay and lesbian couples should be al        1,962       33.63       59.60
1. There should be no legal recognition        1,515       25.97       25.97
                                                                            
        PRE: R position on gay marriage        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
                                  Total        5,855      100.00
                                                                            
4. By law, a woman should always be abl        2,678       45.74      100.00
3. The law should permit abortion for r          898       15.34       54.26
2. The law should permit abortion only         1,607       27.45       38.92
1. By law, abortion should never be per          672       11.48       11.48
                                                                            
      PRE: STD Abortion: self-placement        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
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             _cons    -1.090979   .1352149    -8.07   0.000     -1.35612   -.8258389
            gender     .0234374   .0163782     1.43   0.153    -.0086784    .0555532
              race     .2606822   .0186327    13.99   0.000     .2241457    .2972186
      dem_avgclass     .0220893   .0197871     1.12   0.264    -.0167109    .0608894
            income       .00021   .0011422     0.18   0.854    -.0020298    .0024498
         giniindex     1.232561    .267268     4.61   0.000     .7084803    1.756642
inequality_goodbad     .0441637   .0138969     3.18   0.002     .0169136    .0714138
    gov_inequality     .2879413   .0135792    21.20   0.000     .2613141    .3145684
    inequality_gap     .1004217   .0165713     6.06   0.000     .0679273    .1329161
                                                                                    
       vote_choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    644.913328  2595  .248521514           Root MSE      =  .41327
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3128
    Residual    441.846347  2587  .170794877           R-squared     =  0.3149
       Model    203.066981     8  25.3833726           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  2587) =  148.62
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2596
                                                                                    
             _cons    -1.090979   .1352149    -8.07   0.000                        .
            gender     .0234374   .0163782     1.43   0.153                 .0235112
              race     .2606822   .0186327    13.99   0.000                 .2455847
      dem_avgclass     .0220893   .0197871     1.12   0.264                 .0193996
            income       .00021   .0011422     0.18   0.854                 .0032839
         giniindex     1.232561    .267268     4.61   0.000                 .0772594
inequality_goodbad     .0441637   .0138969     3.18   0.002                 .0572279
    gov_inequality     .2879413   .0135792    21.20   0.000                 .3900449
    inequality_gap     .1004217   .0165713     6.06   0.000                 .1029658
                                                                                    
       vote_choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                                    
       Total    644.913328  2595  .248521514           Root MSE      =  .41327
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3128
    Residual    441.846347  2587  .170794877           R-squared     =  0.3149
       Model    203.066981     8  25.3833726           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  2587) =  148.62
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2596
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             _cons    -.7693684   .1077646    -7.14   0.000    -.9806871   -.5580497
           idscale     .0513452   .0061732     8.32   0.000     .0392399    .0634504
           partyid     .1211182   .0043143    28.07   0.000     .1126581    .1295783
            gender    -.0107136   .0129667    -0.83   0.409    -.0361403    .0147131
              race      .089223   .0156172     5.71   0.000     .0585987    .1198474
      dem_avgclass      .021457   .0156225     1.37   0.170    -.0091777    .0520917
            income     .0009549   .0009032     1.06   0.290    -.0008162     .002726
         giniindex     .5341568   .2133164     2.50   0.012     .1158586     .952455
inequality_goodbad      .005958   .0112536     0.53   0.597    -.0161095    .0280255
    gov_inequality     .0707857    .012163     5.82   0.000     .0469349    .0946365
    inequality_gap     .0382687   .0133692     2.86   0.004     .0120527    .0644847
                                                                                    
       vote_choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    615.681101  2470  .249263604           Root MSE      =  .31916
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5913
    Residual    250.591027  2460  .101866271           R-squared     =  0.5930
       Model    365.090074    10  36.5090074           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,  2460) =  358.40
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2471
                                                                                    
             _cons    -.7693684   .1077646    -7.14   0.000                        .
           idscale     .0513452   .0061732     8.32   0.000                 .1563766
           partyid     .1211182   .0043143    28.07   0.000                 .5506027
            gender    -.0107136   .0129667    -0.83   0.409                -.0107301
              race      .089223   .0156172     5.71   0.000                 .0825789
      dem_avgclass      .021457   .0156225     1.37   0.170                 .0188617
            income     .0009549   .0009032     1.06   0.290                 .0149346
         giniindex     .5341568   .2133164     2.50   0.012                 .0331749
inequality_goodbad      .005958   .0112536     0.53   0.597                 .0076267
    gov_inequality     .0707857    .012163     5.82   0.000                 .0961479
    inequality_gap     .0382687   .0133692     2.86   0.004                 .0388377
                                                                                    
       vote_choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                                    
       Total    615.681101  2470  .249263604           Root MSE      =  .31916
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5913
    Residual    250.591027  2460  .101866271           R-squared     =  0.5930
       Model    365.090074    10  36.5090074           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,  2460) =  358.40
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2471
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             _cons    -.7587246   .1104926    -6.87   0.000    -.9753942   -.5420551
   abortion_stance     .0310012   .0071283     4.35   0.000      .017023    .0449794
      gay_marriage     .0316709   .0100301     3.16   0.002     .0120024    .0513394
  fedspend_defense    -.0244718    .006557    -3.73   0.000    -.0373297   -.0116139
  fedspend_welfare     .0615919   .0113257     5.44   0.000     .0393828    .0838009
         gov_envir     .0482127   .0109443     4.41   0.000     .0267515    .0696739
     climate_cause     .0217653   .0101607     2.14   0.032     .0018407    .0416899
           idscale     .0219618   .0065423     3.36   0.001     .0091328    .0347908
           partyid     .1082614   .0043608    24.83   0.000     .0997102    .1168126
            gender    -.0133944   .0127663    -1.05   0.294    -.0384284    .0116396
              race     .1003592   .0156434     6.42   0.000     .0696834    .1310349
      dem_avgclass      .011923   .0153102     0.78   0.436    -.0180993    .0419454
            income     .0002273   .0009042     0.25   0.802    -.0015457    .0020003
         giniindex      .353403   .2095503     1.69   0.092    -.0575126    .7643186
inequality_goodbad     .0014894   .0111684     0.13   0.894    -.0204111    .0233899
    gov_inequality     .0375427   .0124512     3.02   0.003     .0131266    .0619589
    inequality_gap      .022761   .0131644     1.73   0.084    -.0030536    .0485757
                                                                                    
       vote_choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    609.776052  2446  .249295197           Root MSE      =  .31071
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6128
    Residual    234.589772  2430  .096539001           R-squared     =  0.6153
       Model     375.18628    16  23.4491425           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 16,  2430) =  242.90
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2447
                                                                                    
             _cons    -.7587246   .1104926    -6.87   0.000                        .
   abortion_stance     .0310012   .0071283     4.35   0.000                 .0666196
      gay_marriage     .0316709   .0100301     3.16   0.002                 .0500188
  fedspend_defense    -.0244718    .006557    -3.73   0.000                -.0526861
  fedspend_welfare     .0615919   .0113257     5.44   0.000                 .0836783
         gov_envir     .0482127   .0109443     4.41   0.000                 .0718704
     climate_cause     .0217653   .0101607     2.14   0.032                 .0320014
           idscale     .0219618   .0065423     3.36   0.001                 .0669911
           partyid     .1082614   .0043608    24.83   0.000                 .4925025
            gender    -.0133944   .0127663    -1.05   0.294                -.0134136
              race     .1003592   .0156434     6.42   0.000                 .0927574
      dem_avgclass      .011923   .0153102     0.78   0.436                 .0104844
            income     .0002273   .0009042     0.25   0.802                 .0035513
         giniindex      .353403   .2095503     1.69   0.092                 .0219352
inequality_goodbad     .0014894   .0111684     0.13   0.894                 .0019025
    gov_inequality     .0375427   .0124512     3.02   0.003                  .051051
    inequality_gap      .022761   .0131644     1.73   0.084                 .0231579
                                                                                    
       vote_choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                                    
       Total    609.776052  2446  .249295197           Root MSE      =  .31071
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6128
    Residual    234.589772  2430  .096539001           R-squared     =  0.6153
       Model     375.18628    16  23.4491425           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 16,  2430) =  242.90
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2447
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Statistics for Graph 1 
Gini index at means 
Minimum (0.385) 
 
Maximum (0.584) 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .5038914   .0158328    31.83   0.000     .4728441    .5349387
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               abortion_s~e    =    2.993461 (mean)
               gay_marriage    =    2.121373 (mean)
               fedspend_d~e    =    2.893747 (mean)
               fedspend_w~e    =    1.631385 (mean)
               gov_envir       =     2.17736 (mean)
               climate_ca~e    =    2.120964 (mean)
               idscale         =    3.740907 (mean)
               partyid         =    4.281978 (mean)
               gender          =    1.490396 (mean)
               race            =    1.307315 (mean)
               dem_avgclass    =    2.215366 (mean)
               income          =    15.61136 (mean)
               giniindex       =        .385
               inequality~d    =    2.481406 (mean)
               gov_inequa~y    =    .8565591 (mean)
at           : inequality~p    =    2.767062 (mean)
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
       _cons     .5742186   .0278835    20.59   0.000     .5195407    .6288965
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               abortion_s~e    =    2.993461 (mean)
               gay_marriage    =    2.121373 (mean)
               fedspend_d~e    =    2.893747 (mean)
               fedspend_w~e    =    1.631385 (mean)
               gov_envir       =     2.17736 (mean)
               climate_ca~e    =    2.120964 (mean)
               idscale         =    3.740907 (mean)
               partyid         =    4.281978 (mean)
               gender          =    1.490396 (mean)
               race            =    1.307315 (mean)
               dem_avgclass    =    2.215366 (mean)
               income          =    15.61136 (mean)
               giniindex       =        .584
               inequality~d    =    2.481406 (mean)
               gov_inequa~y    =    .8565591 (mean)
at           : inequality~p    =    2.767062 (mean)
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
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Gov_inequality at means 
Minimum (0) 
 
Maximum (2) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .4962446   .0123773    40.09   0.000     .4719733    .5205158
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               abortion_s~e    =    2.993461 (mean)
               gay_marriage    =    2.121373 (mean)
               fedspend_d~e    =    2.893747 (mean)
               fedspend_w~e    =    1.631385 (mean)
               gov_envir       =     2.17736 (mean)
               climate_ca~e    =    2.120964 (mean)
               idscale         =    3.740907 (mean)
               partyid         =    4.281978 (mean)
               gender          =    1.490396 (mean)
               race            =    1.307315 (mean)
               dem_avgclass    =    2.215366 (mean)
               income          =    15.61136 (mean)
               giniindex       =    .4543564 (mean)
               inequality~d    =    2.481406 (mean)
               gov_inequa~y    =           0
at           : inequality~p    =    2.767062 (mean)
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
                                                                              
       _cons     .5713301   .0155612    36.72   0.000     .5408155    .6018446
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               abortion_s~e    =    2.993461 (mean)
               gay_marriage    =    2.121373 (mean)
               fedspend_d~e    =    2.893747 (mean)
               fedspend_w~e    =    1.631385 (mean)
               gov_envir       =     2.17736 (mean)
               climate_ca~e    =    2.120964 (mean)
               idscale         =    3.740907 (mean)
               partyid         =    4.281978 (mean)
               gender          =    1.490396 (mean)
               race            =    1.307315 (mean)
               dem_avgclass    =    2.215366 (mean)
               income          =    15.61136 (mean)
               giniindex       =    .4543564 (mean)
               inequality~d    =    2.481406 (mean)
               gov_inequa~y    =           2
at           : inequality~p    =    2.767062 (mean)
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
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Statistics for Graph 2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                      
               _cons    -1.382668   .3040669    -4.55   0.000    -1.978896   -.7864401
                      
c.income#c.giniindex    -.1231617   .0374962    -3.28   0.001    -.1966859   -.0496374
                      
           giniindex     4.427926   .6627919     6.68   0.000     3.128294    5.727558
              income      .050117   .0171922     2.92   0.004     .0164059    .0838282
                                                                                      
         vote_choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                      
       Total    669.721378  2698  .248228828           Root MSE      =  .48871
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0378
    Residual    643.680009  2695  .238842304           R-squared     =  0.0389
       Model     26.041369     3  8.68045634           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,  2695) =   36.34
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2699
                                                                              
       _cons      .324783   .0497939     6.52   0.000     .2271449    .4224212
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               giniindex       =        .385
at           : income          =           1
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
                                                                              
       _cons     .3976775   .0427941     9.29   0.000      .313765      .48159
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               giniindex       =        .385
at           : income          =          28
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
                                                                              
       _cons     1.181431   .0819121    14.42   0.000     1.020814    1.342048
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               giniindex       =        .584
at           : income          =           1
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
                                                                              
       _cons      .592578   .0724607     8.18   0.000     .4504937    .7346622
                                                                              
                   Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               giniindex       =        .584
at           : income          =          28
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict()
